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I. INTRODUCTION 
A basic problem in the general equilibrium theory of money is to justify the 
existence of a monetary equilibrium, an equilibrium in which traders are 
collectively prepared to hold the stock of a money with no intrinsic worth 
(Hahn [ 131). Explicit consideration of inter-temporal economies with 
sequential trading (initiated by the studies of Grandmont [6], Green [12] 
and Stigum 121,221) has helped to expose more clearly some of the funda- 
mental requirements. (See Grandmont [7] for a survey.) For exampIe, in [6] 
and in Grandmont and You&s [lo] it is shown that such an equilibrium will 
exist, for an economy in which money is the unique store of value, provided 
that people expect money to have positive value in the future. This condition 
amounts to inelasticity of price expectations, at least as the current relative 
price of money approaches zero. The analysis is extended in Grandmont and 
Laroque [8,9] to an economy in which there is an alternative financial asset, 
a long-term bond, with the current rate of interest tied at a positive level by 
a central bank. Again, inelastic expectations, now extended to the interest 
rate, permit the compatibility of money and interest-bearing assets. 
While the assumption of inelastic expectations is not unreasonable for 
many circumstances (e.g., when prices have been stable in the recent past), 
it is sufficiently powerful to dominate some considerations which can be 
illuminating for the existence problem. The analysis would apply to any 
asset, paper or otherwise; it does not exploit the distinguishing features of 
money. From the point of view of monetary theory it seems desirable to 
develop these properties (Grandmont and You&s [lo, 111). In fact, it can be 
shown (Ho01 [17]) that, if money is the sole store of value and if its role as 
the medium of exchange is explicitly introduced using a dichotomized budget 
constraint (as suggested by Clower [2] and adopted in modified form in [lo]), 
1 This is a revised version of a paper written at ENSAE, Paris, and the University of 
Warwick. I wish to thank both of these institutions for the facilities they provided. 
I am indebted to Jean-Michel Grandmont for many valuable comments on earlier 
versions. I have benefited also from discussions with Donald Hester, Donald Nichols, 
Charles Wilson, and Yves Your&s, and from the helpful criticisms of a referee. 
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then the equilibrium value of money will be positive if there is a suitable 
balance between price expectations (which may be unit-elastic), the inter- 
temporal profile of initial endowments and intertemporal preferences. This 
result prompts the question: Does this continue to be the case if there is an 
alternative, interest-bearing asset? If the latter asset’s yield were uncertain 
and possibly negative, one might look to speculation to induce the necessary 
desire to hold money. However, if the asset’s yield were surely positive, one 
would expect people to be prepared to hold money (in the short run) only if 
they have no choice. Money’s value in such a case must derive from its 
designated role in the exchange process and is thus connected with the 
illiquidity of physical commodities. 
A second, related question is: In an economy in which the rate of interest 
is determined endogenously by the relative strengths of individuals’ desires 
to borrow or lend, what is the basic force guaranteeing a strictly positive 
equilibrium rate (or, more generally, an equilibrium rate greater than some 
given positive level)? We know that inelastic interest-rate expectations-the 
standard explanation-will do it, and that this is connected with the notion 
of a “liquidity trap” (Keynes [18], Tobin [23], Grandmont and Laroque [9] 
and Younbs [24]). So the question becomes: Is there anything more funda- 
mental than inelastic interest-rate expectations which will guarantee a rate 
greater than zero and, if so, how is it related to a liquidity trap? 
To analyze these questions a micro-model of the demand for money is 
developed in the context of an intertemporal economy in which money has its 
traditional triad of roles and individuals make their intertemporal con- 
sumption choice and portfolio choice simultaneously (Section 2). The main 
implications of the study are to be drawn from the sufficient conditions for 
existence of a short-run monetary equilibrium (Section 3). This will involve 
the establishment of properties of the demand for money, individual and 
aggregate, in various circumstances relating to the behavior of prices and 
the interest rate. Since the model has some general features in common with 
Green’s 1121, several of the assumptions required are similar to his. However, 
because the forward markets are restricted here to money and bonds, the 
assumption of “common expectations” ([12]) is not necessary (see 
Lemma A.l). Also, the conditions of interest here are those which bear 
specifically on the properties of the demand for money. They will be developed 
from the necessary conditions for an individual’s optimal choice. Concluding 
remarks are presented in Section 4. All proofs are gathered in the Appendix. 
2. A MODEL OF THE DEMAND FOR MONEY 
We consider a pure exchange economy with I traders (i = 1, 2,..., I), 
operating over a sequence of time periods (t = 1, 2,...). In each period there 
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are N perishable consumption goods, fiat money and long-term bonds. 
Money is the unit of account, the medium of exchange (taken as an insti- 
tutional fact) and a store of value. The total quantity, M, of money is 
constant over time. Bonds are perpetuities paying one unit of money in 
each period after purchase. In each period the only markets operating are 
spot markets for trading each of the real goods and bonds against money. 
The two essential aspects of the demand for money with which the analysis 
is concerned are (i) the demand arising from the use of money as the means of 
payment, and (ii) the speculative demand, arising from uncertainty about 
future bond prices (equivalently, future interest rates) and thus the resultant 
yield of a bond. Without the possibility of a capital loss greater than the 
interest payment there can be no speculative demand for money. The 
distinction of money as the medium of exchange is formalized by assuming 
that consumption goods are relatively illiquid: there is a delay between the 
commitment to sell a good and the opportunity to spend the revenue. 
Specifically, money received from sales conducted in one trading period 
cannot be spent (on goods or bonds) until markets reopen in the next period. 
(This corresponds formally to an exchange process in which there is one 
round of actual trading in goods per period and, in each round, offers to buy 
and sell are expressed simultaneously on each market, an offer to buy being 
valid only if backed by cash.) Bonds, like consumption goods, must be 
purchased with cash. But it will be assumed that bonds, unlike consumption 
goods, are instantly convertible into cash. (In this sense bonds are as liquid 
as money, although in another sense (cf. Hicks [16], for example) they have 
imperfect liquidity because of the uncertainty of their future market values.) 
This means that an individual can generate immediate purchasing power by 
borrowing whereas current sales of goods provide income only for future 
purchases (including debt liquidation). The decision with respect to purchases 
in the current period implies a reservation demand for money; the value of 
goods supplied constitutes an income demand for money (cf. Clower [2]). 
It is to be stressed that, because of the illiquidity of goods and of the institu- 
tiona1 use of money as the means of payment, an income demand for money 
is the inevitable consequence of the sale of a good. This plays a crucial role 
in the later analysis. It provides the analytical distinction in the model 
between money and bonds as means of exchange. 
Let pt E R+N, qt E R, and 1 be the money prices of goods, bonds and 
money in period 1; rt = l/q, is the rate of interest; 7~~ = (pt, qt , 1) is the 
monetary price system. The set of admissible price systems in period t is 
IT = (nt E R;+* j nt > O}. 
Consider a typical individual (whose index i is omitted where inessential). 
At the start of each period t he receives an initial endowment of consumption 
goods, Wt E R+N, and has an initial portfolio of bonds and money, 
(h-, , mt-d E R x R, , as a result of his choice in the previous period. To 
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avoid consideration of bankruptcy in the first period (t = 1) it is assumed 
that there is no outstanding debt. It will also be convenient to assume that 
the commodity endowments in periods 1 and 2 (w = (wl , 02)) and the initial 
money balance in period 1 (m,,) are strictly positive. Formally, 
(2a) for all i, (i) (wi , WQ,,) > 0 and (ii) b, = 0. 
The individual’s problem in period 1 is to choose an action 
a, = (x1 , b, , m,), where x1 E R+N, b, E R, m, E R, are final demands for 
goods, bonds and money balances, respectively. The expenditure constraint 
(or liquidity constraint) reflecting money’s role as the means of payment, is 
Consequently, 
Pl . (Xl - 4+ + qlbl < m. . (2.1) 
ml = m. - qlbl - p1 * (x1 - ml)+ + p1 * (xl - 4- (2.2) 
where (a)+, (.)- denote vectors of purchases and sales, respectively. Note 
that, in view of (2.1), m, > p1 * (x1 - w& > 0. The more familiar form of 
(2.2) is the budget equation: 
p1 - xl + qlbl + ml = p1 - w1 + m, . (2.2’) 
The individual evaluates alternative actions according to his intertemporal 
preferences for consumption. To simplify notation and exposition it will be 
assumed that, in order to take account of the effects of a current action, the 
individual considers only his consequent position in the succeeding period 
and evaluates it as if any credit (or debt) were then realized. In this way his 
consequent financial position is assessed in real terms; the appropriate 
intertemporal utility function is therefore one which represents his preferences 
for combinations of current consumption and “quasi” future consumption. 
Let this utility function be denoted by u, with the properties 
(2b)(i) for all i, ui: RtN --+ R is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
function which is strictly increasing, continuously differentiable, concave 
and bounded; and 
(ii) for all i, if (x,~) is any bounded sequence in R+N with a strictly 
positive lower bound, then there exists a k and numbers j&, Fti, with 
pk > & > 0, such that jSrc < au,(xln, xZn)/axzlc < & for all n, for any 
sequence (x1”) in R,N. 
Condition (ii) will be used only in the proof of Proposition 3.4. It implies 
that the marginal utility of second period consumption is determined 
primarily by that consumption, and that there is always non-satiation in 
some good in the second period. 
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The individual’s expectations about prices in period 2 depend on current 
prices and take the form of a probability distribution, $(rr,), with the 
PropeW 
(2~) for all i, &(a) is continuous in the topology of weak convergence. 
A borrower in period 1 must generate sufficient money for period 2 to cover 
his debt, in any circumstance that he considers possible. An action in period 1 
is therefore further constrained by 
(q2 + 1) bl + ml > 0, for all rrZ E supp #(rl) (2.3) 
For each rrZ E supp #(rr&, the constraints on the individual’s choice in 
period 2 are 
and 
p2 - (x2 - w2)+ < (q2 + 1) bl + ml (2.4) 
~2 * x2 = ~2 * ~2 + (42 + 1) b, + ml . (2.5) 
(Note that because of (2.3) the right-hand sides of (2.4) and (2.5) are non- 
negative. Further, utility maximization requires (2.4) to hold as an equality.) 
So the individual must choose a plan (x1 , bl , m, , x2) which maximizes 
JI7 4x19 x2) 44T 7 7r2), subject to (2.1) through (2.5), where #(n, , *) denotes 
#(nl)(*). Implied by the set of such plans is the set [,(n,) of his optimal 
actions for period 1. 
Of particular relevance to the existence of a temporary equilibrium will be 
the following relationships implied by the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the 
above optimization; k denotes the index of goods in each period, U: the 
marginal utility of good k evaluated at the optimum. 
for all (kl , k,) with xlk, > 0; 
for all (kl , k2) with x,,~ > wlLl and x2k, > W+ 
(2.8) 
for all k2 with xakr > W+ . 
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These conditions specify that there should be no remaining advantage to be 
gained by transfer of wealth from period 1 to period 2 via money, by transfer 
of wealth between periods 1 and 2 via bonds, or by pure speculation, 
respectively. 
3. MONETARY EQUILIBRIUM 
A temporary monetary equilibrium in period 1 is a price system rr: EZZ 
and Z actions aA (i = 1,2,..., Z) such that 
and 
C az*, = C wil ; 
z i 
where wiI = (wil, 0, rn& is the initial endowment of individual i, and 
xi mi, = M. Assumptions made below will apply cumulatively for each 
individual. 
For a preliminary result on the properties of individual demand corre- 
spondences, we assume 
(3a) for every n1 E II, Elf2 E supp #(rrJ such that q2 + 1 > q1 , and 
(3b) the correspondence supp $(*) is upper-hemicontinuous on Z7. 
It is then straightforward to establish 
LEMMA 3.1. (i) &(.) is nonempty-, convex-, compact-valued and upper- 
hemicontinuous on 17; 
(ii) Tl * &(4 = 71 ~w,,firaN~~,~lI. 
Assumption (3a), requiring a positive probability of a positive net yield 
on bonds, is used to rule out unbounded borrowing (speculative selling of 
bonds) for q1 > 0 (cf. assumption 2.6(ii) of [12].) Assumption (3b), together 
with (2c), implies the continuity of supp #(a) (see [12]) required for the 
continuity of the feasible choice set. 
The proof of existence of a monetary equilibrium will require the boundary 
conditions that (i) aggregate excess demands for goods and bonds become 
arbitrarily large as their respective prices approach zero, and (ii) the aggregate 
excess demand for money becomes arbitrarily large when the prices of goods 
or bonds become arbitrarily high. To ensure the desired behavior as prices 
go to zero, it is sufficient to assume 
(3~) there exists u > 0 such that supp +4(e) is uniformly bounded 
below by (J, and 
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(3d) for any sequence (Tag> in U, if for any k the corresponding 
sequence ( p$) (respectively, (qIn)) is bounded, then < p.$J (respectively, 
(qZn)) is bounded for any (nZn) with rZn E supp $J(?T~~) for all n. 
Assumption (3d) means that expectations about the future price of any 
particular commodity (including bonds) are influenced primarily by the 
current price of the commodity. Together with (3c), (3d) implies that, for 
any convergent sequence of current price vectors, any sequence of future 
price vectors considered possible will be contained in a compact subset of fl. 
(Note: (3d) would be unnecessary if we had assumed some variant of uniform 
tightness of 4, as in [6, 8,241.) Formally, we have 
LEMMA 3.2. Let (rrIn) be any sequence in Il, and (aIn) any sequence with 
aIn E E1(vrI~)fir all n. If vrp -+ 7rIa E~\II then I/ uln I/ -+ + CO. 
The boundary condition (i) above then follows from aggregation of 
individual, demand behavior. 
It is property (ii) that is most directly relevant to the issues under investi- 
gation and it is here that the optimality conditions (2.6)-(2.8) are utilized. 
If the prices of goods or bonds become arbitrarily high then, uhimately, if 
these conditions (appropriately specified) are not satisfied an individual will 
want to take an action that would generate the necessary downward pressure 
on prices. We establish first that, under certain conditions, when the price 
level of consumption goods becomes arbitrarily high, (a) the demand for 
money or bonds becomes arbitrarily large (regardless of the movement of 
the interest rate); and (b) provided that the bond price is bounded away 
from zero, the demand for money alone becomes arbitrarily large. The 
sufficient condition for this result is motivated by (2.6) and (2.7) and imposes 
a restriction on expectations: 
(3e) for any sequence (nln) in 17 with pyk -+ + cc for all k, there is 
some commodity k for which either 






PROPOSITION 3.3. Let (rIn) be any sequence in 17 and (aIn:) any sequence 
with aIn E ~l(vIn) for all n. 
(a) If lIpIn 11 -+ + 00 then either mIn is unbounded abooe or b,” is 
unbounded above. 
(b) If jl pl” /j 4 + 03 and qIn is boundedawayfrom zero then mIn -+ + CO. 
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The proof of this proposition is essentially an arbitrage argument using (3e), 
exploiting the fact that goods are illiquid and payments must be made in cash: 
any sale of a good at an arbitrarily high price implies an arbitrarily large 
(income) demand for money. The argument does not depend on uncertainty 
about interest rates and the possibility of a negative bond yield; the result 
would hold just as well if bonds had a sure positive return. 
The conclusions of Proposition 3.3 will hold, a fortiori, when the bond price 
also becomes arbitrarily high. But it is not yet established that either jl a, I( 
or, in particular, m, becomes arbitrarily large when q1 + + cc but p1 is 
bounded. For this, the similarity with Proposition 3.3 suggests an assumption 
based on the optimality condition (2.8). But for bounded sequences (pl”> 
(and hence all associated (p2”)), there is no interpretation independent of the 
particular sequence. This condition must be strengthened in several ways 
in order to guarantee that m, is unbounded above. Define, for any sequence 
(nr%) in L7 and any T > 0, 
It will be assumed first that, as the bond price gets arbitrarily high (i.e., as 
the interest rate approaches zero), the individual becomes subjectively certain 
that there will be a fall in the capital value of a bond at least equal to the 
nominal interest payment. It will be further assumed that, when ql” is 
arbitrarily large, there is a positive subjective probability that there will be a 
negative rate of return whose magnitude, 1 - (q2 + 1)/q,“, is greater than 
some arbitrarily small positive number. Formally, 
(3f)(i) for any sequence (7~~~) in 17 with qIn -+ + 00 
(a) ‘,‘tnp #(7~,~, B”) = I; 
(b) jr,01 > 0 such that #(rln, B,“) > cx for n sufficiently large. 
It will also be required that 
(3f)(ii) for any sequence (rlln) in L7 and any sequence (7~~~) such that 
n2n E supp #(~-,n) for all n, 
g. 
41” 
is uniformly bounded above. 
The conditions (3f) rule out inflationary bond price expectations. On the 
other hand, they are implied by, but do not imply, inelastic expectations. 
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PROPOSITION 3.4. Let (7~~~) be any sequence in I7 with ql” - + co, and 
(a,“) any sequence with din E &(rl”) for all n. Then mIn + + CO. 
Thus, an individual with expectations consistent with (3f) becomes a 
speculative seller of bonds as the interest rate approaches zero. In this 
situation the demand for money, by the individual and thus in the aggregate, 
is unbounded, i.e., there is a “liquidity trap” at a zero rate of interest. 
Assumption (3f) could have been strengthened to apply to sequences (7~~~) 
with qln + Zjl < + ~13 (i.e., rln ---f ?, > 0) and Proposition 3.4 restated to 
apply to such sequences. There would then be a liquidity trap at some 
strictly positive rate of interest, F1 (cf. Your& [24]). The preceding results 
concerning individual behavior can be aggregated without further assump- 
tions (see Properties of the aggregate excess demand correspondence and 
Lemma A. 1 in the Appendix). In particular, it is not necessary to assume the 
existence of a region of common interest rate expectations [12, pp. 1114-l 1171. 
We can now assert the existence of an equilibrium in which money has a 
positive exchange value and the interest rate is positive. 
THEOREM 3.6. There exists a temporary monetary equilibrium in period 1. 
In an economy in which the interest rate is a target of central bank policy 
with money supply variable, rather than being endogenously determined 
with a fixed money supply, the above analysis could be applied to show that 
achieving a rate arbitrarily close to zero would require an arbitrarily large 
money stock. This is the implication found by Grandmont and Laroque [9]. 
The result here suggests that the class of economies for which this applies is 
broader than that described in [9]. With the stronger form of (3f) remarked 
on above, leading to unbounded speculation in the limit as the interest rate 
falls to some 7, > 0, a temporary equilibrium would exist with rl > F, . 
Correspondingly, a monetary authority could not depress the interest rate 
to ?I or below with a finite stock of money. 
4. CONCLusION 
The model analyzed above presented a theory of the demand for money 
within a general framework of intertemporal choice. It was shown that 
money’s institutional role as the medium of exchange is sufficient to assure its 
positive value in terms of consumption goods, provided that an intertemporal 
transfer of wealth is desirable. This is in spite of the existence of an alternative 
financial asset, even if that asset bears a surely positive rate of return. 
(A speculative demand will further reinforce money’s positive value.) This 
conclusion stems from the way in which illiquidity of consumer goods leads 
inevitably to an income demand for cash. The latter is a rather technical 
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demand for money but might be expected to be present even with more 
complete characterizations of the trading process. A consideration of the 
nature of the central argument (in Proposition 3.3) indicates that the ad hoc 
expenditure constraint (2.1) could be replaced by a more general technological 
requirement of transactions without altering the conclusion. However, while 
it has been taken as a fact that money is the medium of exchange, this 
situation is unlikely to persist over time unless there are transaction costs or 
there is a possibility of negative yields for other paper assets. 
Justifying a lower bound to the rate of interest was seen to be an essentially 
separate issue (Proposition 3.4) because of an asymptotic Keynesian 
dichotomy between those forces determining the desirability of an inter- 
temporal transfer of purchasing power (the consumption/saving decision) 
and those which determine the form in which this purchasing power is held 
(the portfolio decision) (cf. [24]). A motive for speculation was shown to be 
a more primitive explanation for a positive rate of interest than inelasticity 
of interest-rate expectations or any direct postulate of a liquidity trap. 
Finally, it has been observed that the existence of a monetary equilibrium 
in Patinkin’s [19] simpler model (without bonds) can be guaranteed only by 
giving up the unit-elasticity assumption on expectations which is vital for 
Patinkin’s comparative static analysis (see [6, 7]), or by adding more structure 
(as in 1171). The first alternative clearly still applies to Patinkin’s model with 
bonds. The result of the present paper shows that the second alternative is 
also available: the unit-elasticity assumption can be retained if formal 
account is taken of money’s role in the exchange process. 
APPENDIX 
Properties of the Individual’s Choice Correspondence 
The feasible choice set for an individual in period 1, corresponding to any 
given 7/r E II, is 
A,(rr,) = {a, = (x1 , b, , ml) E RN+2 ] (2. l), (2.2’) and (2.3)). 
It is straightforward to show that, for all 7~~ E 17, 
(i) A,(q,) is nonempty and convex; and 
(ii) A,(.R,) is compact if and only if (3a). 
Further, given the continuity of the correspondence supp 1+5(m) (assumption 
(WI, 
(iii) the correspondence A,(.) is continuous on 17. 
Consider any sequence (rln) in II and any sequence (aIn) with 
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a,” E A1(7rln). Together, (2.3) and (3a) imply that ql”bln + mln > 0 for all n. 
Consequently, 
(iv) ql%” + - co implies mln + + co. 
It also follows from (2.3) that bl” is bounded below if ml” is bounded 
above; so 
(v) bl” ---f -co implies mln -+ + co. 
Properties of the Individual’s Demand Correspondence 
For any given a, E A,(r,) and irTTz EIi’, let x2(al , r2) denote any x2 E R+N 
which maximizes u(xl, x2) subject to (2.4) and (2.5). The expected utility 
index, v(al , 7r1) := JII u(xi , x2(al , nz)) d#(n, , xJ, is continuous in both 
arguments, concave and monotone in the first (see [6]). It then follows, using 
the above properties of A,(*), that the individual’s demand correspondence 
tl(*), defined by 
is nonempty-, convex-, compact-valued and upperhemicontinuous on 17. 
From the budget equation (2.2’), tl(.) must satisfy n1 * tl(nl) = 7~~ * w1 , 
for all r1 E U. Lemma 3.1 is thus established. 
Proof of Lemma 3.2 (cf. [6]). In view of (3~) and (3d) we can assume that 
there exists some compact subset of 17 which contains supp #(rr,“) for all n, 
and therefore that #(rrln) converges weakly to some 4”. Then we can define 
vO(a,) = Jfl u(xl , x,(a, , ?T~)) d#O(r,); lim,,, v(ul , 7~~~) = v”(al) and v”(m) is 
continuous and strictly increasing. We consider two cases. (i) If pi1 = 0 for 
some k we can apply the reasoning of [6, Proposition 4.2 of Section IV]. 
(ii) Suppose q10 = 0. Assume that the sequence (al”) converges to alo = 
(x,O, blO, ml”) with b,O < + co; alo is feasible for 7~~~ and ~“(a~“) > v”(ul) for 
all a, feasible for nlO. But a1 = (x1 O & , 1 , m,O), with &1 arbitrarily large, is also 
feasible for 7~~~. Since v”(e) is strictly increasing, vO(&) > vO(a,O), a contra- 
diction. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 3.3. There are three possible situations to consider 
when IIpln I/ - + co: (i) pTk + + 03 for some k and p&, bounded above for 
some k’; in which case, because of (3d), p& will be bounded for any (7~~~) 
with rzn E supp #(7rl”) for all n; (ii) p;;C + + co for all k and pT& -+ + co 
for all k, for all (Tag) with npn E supp #(7r1*); (iii) pyk + + ro for all k but 
there are sequences (rzn), with rTTZn E supp #(nlln), such that p& is bounded 
for some k. In case (i), a diminishing, ultimately negligible, amount of k in 
period 1 can be traded (via m,) for a given finite amount of k’ in period 2. 
The arbitrage argument of [17, Lemma 3.21 can be applied to establish that 
mln --f + co. Case (ii) is the critical one and uses the condition (3e). If (a) of 
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the proposition is false, then (bI”, WI,“) is bounded above. From property (v) 
of A,(.), b,” must therefore be bounded below. Since ml* is also bounded 
below, one can assume (bin, m,“) --+ (b,O, ml”). Since pyk -+ + 03 for all k, 
it then follows, using (2.1), that xIn -+ w1 . Likewise, xzn + w2 for any 
xzn = x2(aln, r2) with rr2 E supp #(nIn) for all n. Suppose (i) of (3e) holds. 
Define XIn = xIn - (l/p;& e, (where e, is the k-th unit vector), hIn = bin, 
ml -“=m In-tI, and XZn= xzn + (I/p,,) ek for all (xZn, n2) such that 
nz E supp $(rIn) and xzn = x2(aln, rJ. For large n, (Zln, X2”) is feasible, and 
zz S[( I u xln - - eK , xzn n PYk + & ek) - u(xln, XC)] d# 
by (i), contradicting ~~~~[~(rr~“). Similarly, suppose (ii) of (3e) holds and define 






For large n, 
contradicting aln E &(nln). 
Part (b) of the proposition follows immediately from (a), with the obser- 
vation that (2.1) implies gInbIn < m, . 
The result for case (iii) follows as a combination of(i) and (ii). Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 3.4. Given (b) of Proposition 3.3 it is necessary to 
consider only those (7~~~) with (pin) bounded. Suppose the proposition false, 
i.e., mln +-+ + 00. Then there is a subsequence (a,“) = (xIn, bin, mln) with 
(mlfi) convergent and hence (b,“) convergent to 0. 
For any (r2”) with zITZn E supp #(nIn), (qzn + 1) b,” is bounded above, 
since qlnbln is bounded above (by m,) and q2”/qln is bounded above (3f(ii)). 
Alsopzn is bounded below by u > 0 ((3~)); thus any feasible (x,“) is bounded 
above. Assumption (2b)(ii) then implies that there is a k such that 
U;V+k(xlnP xZn) is bounded above 0 for any feasible (x,~), any (x,“). 
Define an alternative subsequence (al”) by I,” = xln, 6,” = blvL - 8/qln, 
Eiln = m 171 + 15, where 6 > 0 is arbitrarily small. For each xzn = x&u~~, ‘rr,), 
define 
- x2 n = xjln + !I?+$; + 1) *e,. 
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Since x2” > w2 > 0 for all n and q2/qln is bounded above, X2” is feasible for 8 
sulliciently small. Then 
and, with 8 sufficiently small, 






(q2 +$, ‘ln 8&+k(xln, 39 d#(rln, r2). 
Denote these two integrals by An and En, respectively. So z&n, rln) - 
u(uln, rln) gg A” - E”. 
Take T > 0 satisfying (3f)(i). Then 
A” > 
s 
” A - (” + ‘) 8&+k(xln, X49 d$&-,“, r ) 2 . 
BTn %?%k 
From (3d), $j,, > 0 such that &k < j&k , for all 7r2 E supp #(v~“), all n. 
From (2b)(ii), 3Pr > 0 such that u~+~(x~~, x2*) > prc . 
SO A” 3 @k/ij2k) #(n In, B,*) and therefore, from (3f)(i)(b), 3y > 0 such 
that A” 3 y for n sufficiently large. Consider E*. From (3f)(ii), 38 such that 
(42 + 1) - 41% < ikn. From (2b)(ii), Zljlc such that $,&xln, xzn) < j&. 
From (3C), p2k > (Jk > 0, for all 772 E SUpp 7,6(wln), all It. 
using (3f)(i)(a). Thus A” > E” for n sufficiently large, contradicting the 
optimality of uln. Q.E.D. 
Properties of the Aggregate Excess Demand Correspondence 
The economy’s aggregate excess demand correspondence, 5,: l7 --f RN+2, 
is defined by &(rl) = xi &(rrl) - xi wi, . An element of &(7r,) is z1 = 
(Xl - w1 , bl , m, - M), where x1 = xi xi1 , o1 = Et wil , b, = xi bi, and 
m, = xi mi, . It follows from Lemma 3.1 that (i) i,(e) is nonempty-, convex-, 
compact-valued and upper hemicontinuous on f7; and (ii) r1 * <,(rl) = 0, 
for rr, E 17. From Lemma 3.2 and Propositions 3.3 and 3.4 we have further: 
for any sequence (rln> in r;T, (iii) if either rrln --f ~~0 E ff\17 or (1 7~~~ II-+ + co, 
then II S(nln)il ---f + 00. [If II x$ I! + + co or rnFl -+ + cc for some i then, 
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correspondingly, jl xIn 11 + + co or mln -+ + 00. If by1 + + co for some i and 
there is no j for which bj”, -+ - co, then b,” + + co. If b$ -+ - co for some j 
then rn& -+ + cc (Property (v) of A,(.)) and hence mln -+ + a~.] 
LEMMA A. 1. Let (IIn> be a non-decreasing sequence of compact, convex 
subsets of II such that l7 C lJf, 17” and each fin has a nonempty interior. Let 
(rln) and (zl”) be sequences such that, for each n, rln EII”, zln E &(rrln), 
n . 
=1 Zl n = 0, and rrl * z,” < 0 for ~11 rrl E IIn. Then (zln) is bounded. 
ProoJ: (a) (b,“) is bounded. With (3a), bin is bounded on any compact 
subset of 17. For any sequence (rln), (3a) (for each trader) implies the 
existence of a sequence (qzn) such that, for all n, qzn + 1 > ql” and (b,“, m,%) 
must satisfy (because of (2.3) for each trader) (qZn + 1) b,” + mIn > 0 (1). 
Take 5, = ( PI , & , 1) such that ?T1 E 17” for n sufficiently large, in which case 
771 * z,” < 0 and thus &b,” + mln < p1 * w1 + M (2). Since mln > 0 for all 
n, (2) implies b,” < (I/&)( p1 * o1 + M) for all n sufficiently large :. (b,“) is 
bounded above for any (z-m). (l)-(2) implies [(qzn + 1) - &] bin t 
-( pI * w1 + M). Choose ii, such that & < 1 and hence (&,” + 1) - & > 
1 - q1 > 0. Then 
for n sufficiently large. :. (b,“) is bounded below for any (nln). So (b,“) is 
bounded. 
(b) (m,“} is bounded. <ml”) is bounded below by 0. Take gI = 
!Fkl$ 2) E nl; so (3) A * xln + Blbln + mln < PI . w1 + M for all n and 
-. A . w1 + M - &b,” for all n. Since b,” is bounded below, mIn is 
bounded above. So (ml”> is bounded. 
(c) (xi”) is bounded below by 0 and bounded above, from (3) since 
PI > 0 and bin and mln are both bounded. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Theorem 3.6. Let (IIn) be a sequence of subsets of 17 as in the 
statement of Lemma A. 1. For each n, take 2” to be a compact, convex set 
containing the range of &“. Then, using the result of [3], there exists for each 
n a pair (7rln, zt”) such that z,” E &n(~,12), rTT1” . z,” = 0 and r1 * zln < 0 for 
all r1 E rr”. By Lemma A.l, the sequence (7~~~) is bounded. The sequence 
(gin) must therefore be bounded, otherwise Property (iii) of & would be 
contradicted. So there exists a subsequence of (?~r~) converging to rrf. Since 
the corresponding subsequence of (zln) is bounded, Property (iii) of & 
implies Z-T 6 n\17. Therefore rf en. Since & has closed graph and (z,“) is 
bounded, there is a subsequence of (zr”) converging to zf E &(nT); 
=1 **zf =Osince7r,“~z,“=Oforalln;n~~ z: = 0 prohibits both z$ > 0 
and zT -C 0. So if z: # 0 and $ * zf = 0, there exists rrl ~17 such that 
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vrI - z;” > 0 and hence, for n sufficiently large, n1 * zln > 0. But this 
contradicts 7r1 - z,” < 0 for all vI E 17”. Therefore zf = 0. Q.E.D. 
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